Introduction
For a handful of articles, their reference alone is enough to invoke their central idea among economists -Akerlof (1970), Coase (1960) , Lucas (1976) , Stigler (1961) , etc. In many cases, such papers are regarded as the foundation of an entire literature, drawing citations by later researchers that connect their work with the original insight. Tiebout (1956) -people "vote with their feet" -is another such example. This recognition predictably brings professional rewards to the originator, who often shepherds the nascent research program. The papers thereby structure the stock histories of institutions and fields, which their authors are eager to nurture. In this respect, though, Charles M. Tiebout stands out as a notable exception.
It is tempting to ascribe Tiebout's curiosity in this regard to his early death. While teaching at the University of Washington in 1968, Tiebout, known to his friends and colleagues as Charlie, suffered a sudden heart attack and died at the age of 43. Although a well-respected regional economist, colleague, and mentor, the article for which he is remembered had gained less than 50 citations at the time of his tragic passing.
1 This explanation remains incomplete, however. As the history of his academic career reveals, while Tiebout was not present to reap where he sowed, his seed had initially fallen on dry ground. public economics that emerged from an earlier discourse. Sturn (2010) highlights the historical influences -Wicksell, Lindahl, and the German tradition in public finance -that Musgrave drew upon in his work, while Samuelson's complex motivations in the 1954 paper are analyzed by Pickhardt (2006) . The countervailing public choice research program and community built by
Buchanan is the subject of Medema (2000) and (2011) . Marciano (2013) traces the intellectual development of Buchanan's thought in this period through his writings and correspondence with
Samuelson. Collectively, it is a story in which Charles Tiebout only rightfully occupies a footnote.
Indeed, Tiebout's "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure" (1956) , penned as a qualification to Samuelson (1954) , failed to influence the stabilization of postwar public good theory despite his engagement with these key figures in its construction. As a Ph.D student at the University of Michigan in the early 1950s, Tiebout first raised the idea of preferences being revealed for public goods by mobility across local communities in Musgrave's graduate seminar on public finance.
Regardless, Musgrave did not find the idea especially compelling, never addressing it significantly in his own work. Musgrave did bring Tiebout into brief contact with James Buchanan at a 1959 NBER conference, though. Despite their shared interest in local public finance, however, Tiebout did not participate, either personally or intellectually, in the growing public choice research program. Not until after Tiebout's death would Buchanan engage Tiebout (1956 ) (Buchanan and Goetz 1972) .
Similarly, Tiebout also exchanged a series of letters with Samuelson, who authored a short response to Tiebout's paper in 1958. Samuelson had questioned the practicality of the mechanism with an example of optimal marriage assignments. In his letters, Tiebout attempted to reassure Samuelson that he did not view sorting as a solution to the public goods problem either while also subtly pointing out the important differences between Samuelson's illustration and the model. Samuelson was neither persuaded nor interested by the idea and its implications. As a result, Tiebout's obscurity in the immediate postwar history of public economics was not a product of hostility to his contribution or of ignorance of it, but simply of indifference.
Public economics up through Tiebout's death in 1968, though, only provides a partial account of the field's history and almost none at all of Tiebout (1956) 's history. The following year, Wallace Oates published his test of the "Tiebout hypothesis," relating local property values to tax rates and public expenditures. This and the multitude of work that followed pursued lines of inquiry in which the Tiebout (1956) mechanism -eventually termed Tiebout sorting -plays a central role. These include studies of its empirical relevance, the theoretical and equilibrium properties, and applications to public, urban, education, and environmental topics via hedonic, sorting, and computational general equilibrium models. 2 Forty five years on from Tiebout's passing, Tiebout (1956) boasts nearly 11,500 citations, ranking it among the most cited articles in economics. By comparison, Samuelson (1954) claims under 6,000, while Musgrave (1959) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) have built homes of which they may be justly proud. Now the UNO comes along and says they are going to take it away from us.
Couching the harm to residents in economic terms, he further added:
Our town will be like the parking lot for a world's fair. Our people will have to pay higher taxes to offset the loss of property. The UNO says they plan to use our beaches in the summer. I promise they won't use the town of Greenwich if the veterans have their say.
The letter was signed "Disgusted GI." Its author was Charles M. Tiebout. 4 In the final year of a three-year stint in the Navy, Charles would return to Wesleyan 
Ann Arbor
After (1954) with the justification that apart from "Sax, Wicksell, Lindahl, Musgrave, and Bowen," economists had neglected the theory of optimal expenditure (Samuelson 1954, 387) . He further commented on the result that he "learned from the published and unpublished writings of Richard Musgrave that their essential logic is contained in the 'voluntary-exchange' theories of public finance of the Sax-Wicksell-LindahlMusgrave type…" and Bowen's work (Samuelson 1954, 388 (Margolis 1955 , Colm 1956 ) and his elaborations, with graphical aid, 9 in a follow up article (1955) and at the winter 1955 meetings of the American Economic Association and Econometric Society. The paper also prompted an extended correspondence with James
Buchanan (Marciano 2013) . The basic analysis of the 1954 article, though, is familiar and remains significant in two respects: First, for establishing the formal definition of public goods as those consumed collectively. Second, for the famous condition that optimal public expenditure requires summation over individual marginal rates of substitution. Together, the implication, in
Samuelson's phrasing, is the "impossibility of [a] decentralized spontaneous solution" because "any one person can hope to snatch some selfish benefit in a way not possible under the selfpolicing competitive pricing of private goods" (Samuelson 1954, 389) . The underlying problem of public goods is thus the person's lack of incentive to reveal their preferences.
As Musgrave later recalled the story, he explained this logic to his University of Michigan seminar. To this, Tiebout responded with the insight with which his name is now associated: if consumers are able to shop amongst communities supplying public goods, their preferences can 7 After Musgrave's passing, Samuelson reflected that "I look back with considerable embarrassment that my 1954 Review of Economics and Statistics paper on `public goods' received so many citations. Certainly all that I knew of the historic `public goods' literature came from oral Musgrave words and perusal of his 1939 dissertation," (emphasis in original) Samuelson (2008, 167 reflects the preferences of the population more adequately than they can be reflected at the national level. (Tiebout 1956, 416) .
In a thought experiment harking back both to the discussion with Burstein and to his own background, Tiebout asked the reader to "consider for a moment the case of a city resident about to move to the suburbs. What variables will influence his choice of municipality?" (Tiebout 1956, 418) . Formalizing the intuition, Tiebout assumed full knowledge and mobility and no external economies. Two key assumptions were an optimal community size and that communities above or below this level sought to attract or jettison residents to lower their costs.
As examples of the empirical relevance, he cited two prototypical postwar suburban planned developments he was familiar with -Park Forest in South Chicago and Levittown, part of Nassau County. Both communities were postwar entrepreneurial responses to demand for affordable middle-class housing that offered prospective residents -frequently GIs -public amenities, like libraries, open space, quiet, and safety.
The central mechanism in the paper arose from residents moving to communities that fit their preferences, which "replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a good and reveals the consumer-voter's demand for public goods" (Tiebout 1956, 420) . Tiebout also supposed the city managers would bid for services in a national market, with the limiting result being that the supply of public goods met the Samuelson (1954) condition. Consequently, "Spatial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart to the private market's shopping trip" (Tiebout 1956, 422) . Rather than a rigorous proof, as Oates (2006) notes, the crux of the argument relied on establishing assumptions under which the local public sector would approximate a competitive market, with communities behaving like firms and voters like consumers. With respect to mobility costs, Tiebout cited a Koopmans paper presented at the winter 1954
Econometric Society meetings, summarizing that "in a space economy with transport costs there is no general equilibrium solution as set by market forces" (Tiebout 1956, 422) . Mobility, like shopping, is just the consumer-voter "pay[ing] a cost to register his demand…," so the model ostensibly inherited the welfare and existence properties of spatial equilibria (Tiebout 1956, 422) .
In his conclusion, Tiebout returned to Samuelson (1954) to situate his contribution.
Samuelson had suggested that the remaining problem of public good provision was how to find the optimal levels (Samuelson 1954, 389 with the competitive private model may be disappointed" (Tiebout 1956, 424) . On the other hand, he argued:
Those who compare the reality described by this model with the reality of the competitive model-given the degree of monopoly, friction, and so forth-may find that local government represents a sector where the allocation of public goods need not take a back seat to the private sector. (Tiebout 1956, 424) Expressing his meaning in somewhat different language, rather than as an instance of "market failure," local public goods might be looked at as a "government success." The subtext is clear that he placed his own self in this group. Tiebout mailed a reprint to Samuelson, with the note "Since your works are frequently mentioned in this article, I thought you might be interested."
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The letter was one of many that Samuelson received in response to his 1954 paper.
The First Samuelson Exchange
Although (and all) want in the way of collective goods" (Samuelson 1958, 337) . He added that this "attempted solution fits in under one or another of the 'symmetry' principles'" (Samuelson 1958 , 337) -a reference to a parenthetical comment made in the original paper about "utopian voting and signaling schemes" that could be "imagined" (Samuelson 1954, 389) . Such mechanisms, which Samuelson extended to include questionnaires or other devices "like a 'parametric decentralized bureaucrat' who reveals his preferences…" (Samuelson 1954, 389) , he emphasized did not contradict the central theorem. In that light, despite his concession that Tiebout (1956) "goes some way toward solving the problem," Samuelson regarded it as, at best, impractical (Samuelson 1958, 337) . As evidence, he pointed to heterogeneous preferences for school expenditure within "a supposedly homogenous suburb," suggested that people like heterogeneity, and further questioned the ethical implications of allowing groups "to 'run out' on their social responsibilities and go off by themselves" (Samuelson 1958, 337) . He also provided an illustration of the problem as he saw it through the example of marriage.
Evincing no prior awareness of Samuelson's impending response by the comment that "Bob Strotz gave me a copy of your forthcoming paper," Tiebout wrote to Samuelson in May of 1958. 14 Strotz, then the managing editor of Econometrica and the following year a visiting professor at MIT, was also a senior colleague of Tiebout's at Northwestern that he had thanked for comments in his author's note of the 1956 paper. Ignoring the main critique given in the appendix, Tiebout remarked in his short letter to Samuelson:
I'm inclined to agree with your notion that mobility provides no formal solution. In the Federal Expenditure Policy… I used such terms as "less of a problem," "some choice," and "to some extent through mobility…" 15 Tiebout hoped these qualifiers would put his paper in the proper context. He clearly did not see sorting, as it would eventually be termed, as a silver bullet for public good problems. Tiebout sarcastically added in his letter:
By the time of publication I shall not be, "also of Northwestern University." I shall be at UCLA. The reason is obvious. The level and pattern of public goods provided in Santa Monica is preferable to those in Evanston. Tiebout now took exception with the example Samuelson had used to implicate the impracticability of his mechanism. In the appendix of the piece, Samuelson had posed the hypothetical question that given "a group of men and women who have each a preference rating for members of the opposite sex, who will end up marrying whom?" (Samuelson 1958, 337 ).
The Second Samuelson Exchange
Samuelson worked with the case of two men and two women. Their possible preference configurations yielded four separate marriage outcomes that he argued only one of which "fits Tiebout's attempt best" (Samuelson 1958, 338) . This indisputably Pareto-optimal case was the first woman preferring one of the men and the second woman preferring the other man and the men reciprocating. For all other cases, Samuelson argued that a Pareto improvement might be possible "given a social welfare function" and that the configuration arrived at would not be unique (Samuelson 1958, 338 ).
Tiebout's Decemeber 1958 letter to Samuelson bluntly confessed "I don't see what the
mathematics of marriage has to do with local public goods." 18 He made three points, all arguing that the two-sided matching problem Samuelson had posed was inapt. Using his humor to be indirect and remain deferential, the objections Tiebout offered were nevertheless substantive:
1) In terms of a conceptual model -not real world except as a matter of degree -boys A and B have an infinite number of girls to choose from. To be sure, this makes for a rather trivial assignment problem.
2) Disregard this. Do girls (communities) really have any preferences? Like private firms, all they want are customers (husbands).
3) I suppose there might still be a problem if A, with a slight preference for girl 1, got there before B who is wild with passion about 1. Yet, I wonder if this applies to public goods. Aren't they polygamous?
These are some things which bother me. Buchanan, Nov. 5 2012. distribution through "branch" governments became efficient. This was because "benefits from public services may not accrue equally to all residents of a region" (Tiebout 1961, 80) .
Starting from the assumption of uniform tastes and incomes, Tiebout worked with police protection as an illustration. Although a pure public good within a precinct, police protection of a city required determining the optimal number of precincts to provide uniform protection within the city (Tiebout 1961, 82) . With costs a function of precinct size and some curvature assumed on the costs and output, an optimal precinct size could be obtained for any given level of output.
In principle, taxpayers would be willing "to join with their neighbors" to realize this minimum cost (Tiebout 1961, 86) . Rhetorically, the example was designed to show the importance of the spatial dimension, in which fiscal federalism was efficient, for a simplified case; i.e. determining the location of many public goods was as important as determining their level. Tiebout proceeded to discuss relaxations, such as when the benefits are diminishing in distance from the "site of production," as with fire protection, hospitals, or parks. To determine the boundaries in such cases, he supposed a procedure in which a "city planner interviews various residents." (Tiebout 1961, 88) . By assumption, residents would reveal their true willingness to pay.
Describing the resulting "fiscal patterning" of the thought experiment, Tiebout concluded: "When all agencies and branch governments are operating, the spatial patterning will be similar to that for the private sector… The public sector, in other words, will develop along a
Lösch pattern" (Tiebout 1961, 91) . This paralleled his 1956 paper's substitution of firms with communities in the competitive market model. The hypothetical was intentionally unrealistic, however. In particular, it ignored heterogeneity and the overriding problem of preference revelation precisely because this was the place Tiebout wanted to show that sorting would be useful. Tiebout argued that with differences in tastes, "Instead of taking the people as given and trying to fit the nonnational public goods pattern to them, offer a varied pattern of public goods and make it possible for the people to move to suit their tastes" (Tiebout 1961, 92) . He summarized: "To the extent that demands differ, a partial solution [to the problem of determining taxpayer preferences] at the nonnational level is offered through the mobility of people to communities where the pattern of services provided suits their tastes" (Tiebout 1961, 96) .
In this presentation, therefore, Tiebout framed sorting as a contribution to spatial general equilibrium theory with public goods, drawing a correspondence to Lösch's work. This is all the more clear from an examination of a paper Tiebout gave to the Regional Science Association in 1957. There, Tiebout directly quoted Lösch's declaration that for general spatial equilibrium "there is no scientific and unequivocal solution for the location of the individual firm, but only a practical one: the test of trial and error" (Tiebout 1957, 79) . Tiebout cited Koopmans and Beckman (1957) in this regard as a formal demonstration. He elaborated:
This situation may be contrasted with that of finding the optimal short-run output for the firm. Here the conditions and the path, via the step-by-step movement along the quantity axis, may be stated.
The situation with location theory, on the other hand, is analogous to that of a pure theory of public expenditures. As Samuelson shows, the conditions of a public expenditures optimum may be stated, but there is no market mechanism by which this optimum may be reached. (Tiebout 1957, 79) By extension, Tiebout (1956)'s sorting mechanism becomes the analogue of Lösch's "trial and error" for Tiebout.
In his comments on the Musgrave and Tiebout papers as discussant, Buchanan recognized the insight behind mobility across communities. Putting the externality arising from common consumption of public goods in terms of an impossibility to "trade" and equalize marginal rates of substitution, he noted that "individuals can, in effect, 'trade' public goods by shifting from one locality to the other" (Buchanan 1961, 127) . He also connected the incentive to zone, noted by Tiebout as a means whereby "the rich avoid paying taxes for the poor" (Tiebout 1961, 92) , with congestion, which is absent for pure public goods. This point anticipates the theory of club goods that Buchanan later developed (Buchanan 1965) , a complementarity and similarity with Tiebout sorting that sometimes provokes questions of a genetic link between the two ideas. 24 Buchanan's comment here is weak evidence of one. 25 While in this regard the two appeared to be on a similar intellectual wavelength and interested in similar problems at the same time, their personal interaction began and ended in Charlottesville. By this time,
Buchanan's views on public finance had already stabilized (Marciano 2013 Tiebout (1956) for the efficient supply of public goods. Musgrave noted the simplifications, but concluded, consonant with Tiebout's framing in the conference paper, that "the possibility of moving to other communities establishes something equivalent to a market mechanism in local finance" such that "the task of finding a satisfactory solution is simplified" (Musgrave 1959, 133) . While, in contrast with Samuelson, his qualifications hinted at questions about both the properties of sorting under relaxed assumptions and its empirical importance, pursuing these would not be taken up by Musgrave. Local public finance remained a "special case." Both Tiebout and Tiebout (1956) passed unclaimed between the two approaches that came to characterize postwar public economics. 26 These competing approaches to public finance surface in the subsequent sorting literature traced to Tiebout (1956) , typically as either median-voter or manager-entrepreneur models of local public good determination. 27 Plan of Study at the Center for Advanced Study, Palo Alto, CA, 1955-56. A more serious part of efforts will be to extend this work in the direction of a systematic approach to the study of the political system of a local community with particular implications for the comparative study of political behavior. The Lakewood Project -the study of the contract system in Los Angeles -will be approached in light of the model furnished by economics. Rather than as a limited examination of relations between political units, this study will evaluate the performance of the county government as a seller of goods and services, and of particular local units as the buyers of these services, as unions organized to meet the demand of consumers (the citizens).
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Economic theory would be invaluable for escaping political scientists' "compulsion to want to superimpose a structure in such political situation [s] ." 30 The document explicitly adopted the structure-conduct-performance analysis from industrial organization. A rough draft of the first chapter related the "quasi-market" contract system to Tiebout (1956) him led Ostrom to entertain outside offers to leave UCLA. 35 As for the theoretical project, Tiebout, Ostrom, and Warren resolved to rework the chapter into a paper, which they sent to the American Political Science Review that developed the analysis of polycentric political systems -the "multiplicity of federal and state agencies, counties, cities, and special districts that govern within a metropolitan region" (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961, 831 (1964) , furthered the development and analysis of polycentric systems. The theoretical framework treated city councils and professional administrators in a decentralized governmental arrangement as consumers competitively bargaining over municipal service contracts, akin to the assumption supposed in Tiebout (1956) and increasingly reflective of the urban reality. Tiebout discussed the paper at the 1962 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Tiebout's own subsequent work in local public economics examined economies of scale and cost-benefit analysis in the public sector, both in the context of the "chaos" of metropolitan finance arising from "balkanization" and epitomized by the Lakewood Plan (Houston and Tiebout 1962; Chinitz and Tiebout 1965 
Conclusion
Warren wrote to Ostrom on January 16 th , 1968:
Perhaps you will have heard by the time this reaches you, but I thought it important to write that Charlie Tiebout has died. He was working in his office early this morning and had a heart attack. I have none of the details but apparently it was impossible to revive him.
It is a strange and disquieting task to write this letter. Yes, I saw Charlie yesterday. No, no one expected it. Yes, there are many things to say but "a friend is dead" covers them all. (Warren to Ostrom, Jan. 16 1968) .
At the time of his passing, Charles Tiebout was not regarded as a public economist nor was his name associated with the massive literature that would grow from Oates's 1969 "test" of the "Tiebout hypothesis." In his shortened lifetime, those capable of crediting his now famous insight did not regard it as interesting and the academic community that would eventually credit it did not yet exist. Rather, Tiebout was best known for his irreverent humor, generosity with colleagues and students, and for his work in regional economic analysis. The latter included his collaboration with W. Lee Hansen on a model of the California economy (Hansen and Tiebout 1963 ) and analyses of the implications of defense and space expenditures for local economies (Peterson and Tiebout 1964, Houston and 
